任澤平：中國經濟新周期 瑞士信貸：亞洲金融危機20年……誰是下一個……泰國1990 vs.現時中國

中國經濟新周期還是金融危機？瑞士信貸：亞洲金融危機20年...誰是下一個...泰國1990 vs.現時中國

經濟

好不好？

經濟學家和有關部門見仁見智。起碼宏觀數據是好的，6.7到8的雞的屁增長似乎很平穩。

但從

老百姓來說，生活好不好才是真的。

昨天中午吃飯，一個收入還不錯的兄弟說了幾個事情，你說現在的生活吃個飯當然是沒有問題，但吃個飯以前和女朋友出來一次預算100多就夠，看個電影也就幾十，買個套套也不貴，現在呢，吃個飯預算500，看個電影200...再加上房貸，家裡還出了一些問題，so.當看到繁華的購物中心的時候，心裡卻是虛的。

再說，小編自己，以前一家吃飯感覺不是壓力，現在每次覺得很貴，尤其是離家3公里內有2個宇宙超級大的購物中心，裡面都是各種名牌，但大家除了周末來吃飯，都基本不會買東西！

生活

究竟是好了還是？

任澤

平：新周期

那個人名字叫任澤平。出名是因為給我智慧！

說不准他是經濟學家，還是網紅。另外一個網紅當然是李大霄，從嬰兒到兒童，媽蛋反正都是他的對。

任澤平 新周期來了 5分鐘前：

經濟觀察報：您現在認為中國經濟步入換擋周期的經濟L型的一橫，是站在新周期的起點上，這是否意味著中國經濟見底反彈了？

任澤平：2015年的時候，我提出中國經濟可能會在2016年觸底，2016年至2018年，中國經濟可能會是L型走勢。2016年中國經濟見底了，並且走出一波復甦，企業盈利也在恢復。這跟我們當時的判斷是完全吻合的。坦率地講，我們在2015年提出這個判斷的時候，其實市場的分歧是非常大的。

今年我們提出了一個叫「新周期」的觀點。為什麼我們對中國經濟未來的判斷比市場更樂觀一點？我大致講三個邏輯——需求的復甦，供給的出清，新政治周期的開始。需求復甦首先是出口，因為外需復甦，加上人民幣貶值，從去年下半年開始，中國出口在回升。其次，在出口復甦的帶領下從去年下半年製造業投資也在變好。第三個是房地產投資，因為庫存去化充分，所以我們看到房地產投資比市場預期好。經濟差了6年了，我們看到很多傳統行業出清了，中小企業退出了；傳統行業的優勢企業也在壓縮產能，可以看到產能利用率企穩或者回升。所以我看到很多行業的競爭格局在發生變化，企業盈利開始恢復。基於以上邏輯，我們提出「新周期」，對經濟的看法是樂觀的。

還有

一個鼓吹新周期的是他們：

再談新周期動力以及何時開啟。我們認為快的話十三五後期中國經濟有望進入新周期。我們兩年前提出的國際經濟改善、國內市場逐漸出清這兩大因素已經在兌現，目前新增長動力這個關鍵因素還在醞釀，從需求角度看這個新增長動力在於城鎮化和一帶一路，從供給角度看，這個新增長動力在於技術紅利再造（中國製造到中國智造）和制度紅利再造（國企改革）。從中國曆年來的GDP 增長率看，如果按照「谷-谷」法進行劃分，改革開放以來中國經濟共經歷了三個大的周期。第一個周期是從1981 年到1990 年；第二個周期是從1991 年到1998 年；1999 年開始進入第三個大的經濟周期，2007 年是這輪經濟周期擴張的高點，目前處於這輪經濟周期的調整期。在三

個大的經濟周期的擴張期，基本上都處於大的制度紅利釋放期，第一輪經濟周期主要得益於改革開放的提出；第二輪經濟周期主要得益於市場經濟提出；第三輪經濟周期主要得益於入世和重化工業化；預計第四輪經濟周期擴張期將主要得益於改革開放全面深化以及19大之後改革紅利的落地。從增長速度來看，伴隨著中國經濟規模的增加和服務消費佔比的提升，新的經濟周期將呈現增長速度降低、波動幅度趨緩的特徵，目前6.5%-7%底部已經基本探明，新周期的波峰有望在此基礎上有1 個百分點左右的上行。

究竟

有沒有新周期

病樹前頭萬木春，這是小編以前學的，從中國經濟的大勢看，中國領先世界是必然的，很多人主張中國新周期馬上來的也是對的，畢竟他們是政治正確。

但，此前有關領導對於中國的論述很清楚，就是可能是長期的L，記得上一次有人鼓吹通過基建等中國經濟好轉的論調不久，就被乾死了，事實上，最高層對於經濟的本質比所謂的經濟學家要清楚的多。

目前中國面臨的國際環境也是有非常大的不確定性，雖然美國的經濟形勢很好，但你不知道川普究竟會對中國如何，富士康都去了美國，還有印度....

所以，新周期可能不是從報告中吹起來，而是要真正在中國的過去出清之後才可能。今年是亞洲金融危機20周年，瑞士信貸的報告比較了中國現在和當年泰國的情況，雖然小編覺得把中國和泰國比很low，但我們不妨看看！

基本

結論：

亞洲金融風暴的毀滅性影響 The devastating effect of AFC. Foreign currency borrowing got bloated as a result of devaluation, sharply higher rates crushed domestic demand. Two-thirds of the borrowers in Indonesia and half in Thailand defaulted. Stock markets plunged 65-85% and banks P/B multiples plummeted to 0.2x!

亞洲現在有紅旗嗎？-印度=中國=菲律賓！Any red flags in Asia? Our Banking Pressure Index points to stress in the usual suspects India, China and also, surprisingly Philippines (which may be a false alarm). The BIS method of deviation of credit-to-GDP ratio from its long term trend flashes China, Hong Kong and Singapore. The corporate NPL situation in India remains grim, though China has improved lately.

泰國1990 vs 現時中國 Thailand of 1990s vs China of today. The key parallels are (a) artificially low cost of capital, (b) mis-allocation of capital, and (c) unsustainably heavy reliance on capital investment. While this year GDP growth has been robust on both the domestic and external front, these pose risks to China next year, particularly with government s crackdown on bank risks on- and off-balance sheet besides its newfound focus on SOE as well as local government debt. In 2018, we see two of the three components of investment (industrial and real estate) softening while infrastructure may be affected by local govt debt.

中國的緩解因素 As mitigating factors, China has far greater control on domestic growth and cost of capital given a closed capital account and surplus in current account. One key feature to watch will be the "new normal" of single digit M2 growth, especially if China embarks on deleveraging at the economy level. Net-net, we do not see a crash a la AFC but banks are unlikely to be rerated on a sustainable basis until there is clarity on risk and growth dynamics.

Thailand of the 1990s vs the China of today

There are some interesting similarities between Thailand of the 1990s and China of the past several years, notably: (a) artificially low cost of capital—in Thailand the market misperceived cost of capital due to a pegged currency combined with USD borrowings while in China, the government kept it low by squeezing depositors; (b) sharply rising incrementalcapital- output-ratio (ICOR) that implies mis-allocation of capital into projects that are not generating commensurate GDP or adequate returns to cover their cost of capital; and (c) unsustainably heavy reliance on capital investment (GFCF was 42% of GDP in Thailand in 1996, it is 43% in China now) that poses risks to economic growth at some point of time.

However, China learned the lesson from AFC and has far greater control on domestic growth, cost of capital and real interest rates given closed a capital account and surplus in its current account. We believe next year is critical for China as two of the three cylinders in fixed asset investment, industrial and real estate investment, may soften (infrastructure investment could remain aggressive but regulatory crackdown on on- and off-balance sheet risks in the financial sector may hamper that). Plus, single-digit money supply (M2) growth for the first time on record does not augur well for asset prices. If China actually starts deleveraging, i.e., credit growth falls below nominal GDP, a growth shock is likely.

中國

和泰國銀行比較！

Summary of comparison of Thai and Chinese banks

Simi

larities

These have been discussed earlier in this section and summarised below:

Mis-allocation of capital: Both countries followed the investment-driven growth model of Japan, and created over-capacities (including in some industries where they did not have a comparative advantage, such as steel in Thailand) as well as furious investment in real estate (which is considered unproductive in economic terms).

Diminishing corporate sector returns: ROICs fell below cost of capital.

Artificially low cost of capital: In Thailand, borrowers mis-perceived cost of capital to be low due to a combination of pegged currency and USD borrowings. In China, the government kept lending rates artificially suppressed so as to spur investment, allowing low-return projects to be approved and financed (in addition, Chinese companies seem to have less sensitivity to cost of capital in general as opposed to say, India or Indonesia, which also leads to the hurdle rate for a project to be ignored).

Diff

erences

Government ownership of banks and borrowers, regulatory forbearance: In 1997, IMF forced BoT to change the NPL recognition norms which is why NPLs suddenly shot beyond 50% within a few months. In China, it appears that extensive evergreening continues, implying regulatory forbearance. Effectively, Chinese banks are tacking 1.5-2.0% NPLs every year through their P&L and staggering the pain over several years rather than recognising the true underlying impairment upfront.

Currency depreciation: There is no big devaluation in China in the current cycle although the Aug-2015 move did jolt the markets. If anything, the central banks of major world currencies such as USD, EUR and JPY are trying to keep their exchange rates weak through QE and ultra-low interest rates. In that respect, it does not appear that there is a currency driven threat to China s export competitiveness.

External demand: Aside from the currency tailwind, Thailand s recovery from the crisis was aided by strong global trade and growth. If China faces a problem in domestic growth, it may not enjoy the same level of global demand support. Plus, China s export share is very elevated at 23%, it is unlikely to expand much further.

Demographics: This time, China s recovery will be constrained by the size of labour force that may have already started to shrink or is close to that inflection point. This factor has been known to create a drag on economic growth.

Expression of public anger: If we recall correctly, Thailand saw three governments between 1997 and 2000 (Chavalit in 1996-97, Chuan Leekpai 1998-2000, Thaksin came in January 2001), so people got a chance to change their leaders. China does not have the luxury of that mechanism. However, we believe the services sector is doing very well in China, which should cushion unemployment in our view.

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