探究巴菲特的併購機器

Schumpeter

Inside Buffett"s deal machine

Berkshire Hathaway has evolved into an acquisition engine. The returns lookpedestrian

探究巴菲特的併購機器

伯克希爾·哈撒韋公司已成「收購火車頭"，但看起來回報平平

SOME things about Warren Buffett never change, including his non-stop jokes, famous annual letter and his reputation as the world"s best investor. What is less understood is that over the past decade Mr Buffett"s company, Berkshire Hathaway, has sharply altered its strategy. For its first 40 years Berkshire mainly invested in shares and ran insurance businesses, but since 2007 it has shifted to acquiring a succession of large industrial companies.

關於沃倫·巴菲特能有些事情從沒變過,包括頻出的笑話金句、著名的年度致股東信，以及身為全球最佳投資者的盛名。比較不為人所知的是，過去十年，巴菲特的伯克希爾·哈撒韋公司（BerkshireHathaway，以下簡稱伯克希爾）已大幅改變經營策略。該公司在成立的頭40年里主要投資股票，同時經營保險業務，但自2007年起已轉向收購一系列大型工業企業。

In some ways it is hard to criticise Berkshire. Its shares have kept up with the stockmarket and its standing is exalted. It is the world"s seventh-most-valuable publicly traded firm (the other six are tech concerns). But Mr Buffett"s behemoth is a puzzle. Its recent deals have haddrabresults,suggesting a pivot to mediocrity.

從某些方面來說，要指摘伯克希爾很難。它的股票一直能跟上大市水平，公司地位崇高，是全球第七大上市公司（前六家都是科技公司）。但巴菲特的這家巨獸公司令人費解。它近期的併購回報平平，似有漸入平庸之勢。

It has been quite a spree.Since 2007 Berkshire has spent $106bn on 158 firms. The share of its capital sunk into industry has risen from a third to over half. The largest deals include BNSF, a North American railway, Precision Castparts (PC), a manufacturer, various utilities, and Lubrizol, a chemicals business. Further transactions are likely. Berkshire has roughly $100bn of spare cash. In his latest letter, published on February 24th, Mr Buffett complains about high valuations but says there is a possibility of "very large purchases". Berkshire thinks of itself as a friendly buyer towhich families and entrepreneurs are happy to pass on their crown jewels.There is something comforting aboutits mission to be a home for old-school businesses run by all-American heroes.

這一輪併購頗為瘋狂。自2007年以來，它已對158家公司投資共計1060億美元。投入工業領域的資本從佔總額的三分之一增至一半以上。最大型的併購包括北美鐵路公司BNSF、製造企業精密機件公司（PrecisionCastparts，簡稱PC，各類公用事業公司以及化學品公司路博潤(Lubrizol)。公司很可能還有進一步的併購交易。伯克希爾現在持有約1000億美元的備用現金。在上月24日最新發布的巴菲特致股東信中，他抱怨企業估值太高，但表示可能有「非常大的收購行動"。伯克希爾自視為友善的買家，家族和企業家都樂意把自己珍視的企業出售託付。它的宗旨是成為匯聚全美精英人物經營的老牌企業的家園，聽起來讓人感到些許寬慰。

Yet it is not an obvious formula forsuperior performance. Berkshire must pay takeover premiums and has $64bn of goodwill. It enjoys no synergies of the sort corporate buyers claim and unlike private-equity firms does not overhaul management at its targets. There is no clear reason why being owned by Berkshire improves performance. Mr Buffett has largely missed the past decade"s tech boom, the big force behind the stockmarket.

伯克希爾必須支付收購溢價，因而有了640億美元的商譽。伯克希爾的收購併不具備併購者聲稱的那類協同效應，也不像私募股權公司那樣會對目標企業的管理層大換血。沒有明確的理由相信企業被伯克希爾收購後便能改善業績。過去十年是科技熱潮在強力推動股市，而巴菲特在很大程度上錯過了這一大潮。

Can Berkshire turn water into wine? Schumpeter has attempted to answer this by crunching the numbers, using a certain amount ofguesswork. There are two ways to capture how Berkshire creates value, both of which Mr Buffetthas in the past endorsed. One is measuring Berkshire"s own book value and how this increases. The other is to examine its "look through" profits, which are made up of the earnings of its wholly-owned businesses as well as its share of the earnings from the firms in which it owns small stakes.Over the past five years its book value has grown by a compound annual rate of 11%. Berkshire"s look through return on equity (ROE) has usually been 8-9% (all further figures exclude the impact of a $29bn one-off gain booked in 2017 relating to America"s law slashing corporate tax).

伯克希爾能點石成金嗎？熊彼特專欄嘗試通過分析數字再加一點猜測來回答這個問題。有兩種方式來了解伯克希爾如何創造價值，兩者在過去都被巴菲特認可。一是衡量伯克希爾自己的賬麵價值及其增長。另一個方式是計算其「透視""(lookthrough）利潤，即它全資擁有的企業的收益加上其少量持股公司的收益分紅。過去五年，伯克希爾賬麵價值的年複合增長率為11％，透視股本回報率通常為8％至9％（所有數據都排除了2017年290億美元一次性收益的影響，這項收益與美國實施了削減企業稅的法案有關）。

Those results are worthy of Mr Buffett, but the next step is to split Berkshire into two areas and examine the larger part—its acquired industrial businesses, spanning its railway,energy, utility, manufacturing,services and retail units. These have a total book equity of $191bn, most of which was built up in the past decade. By this measure Berkshire is the second-largestindustrial concernin America. The industrial arm"s operating performanceis bog standardand, once you include the goodwill, its ROE is a weak 6%, down from 9% in 2007 before Berkshire shifted course (these sums exclude theamortisationof intangible assets, which is in accordance with how Mr Buffett assesses profits).

這些結果不負巴菲特的英名，但下一步是要將伯克希爾分為兩部分，並審視較大的那部分，也就是它收購的各類工業企業，涵蓋其鐵路、能源、公用事業丶製造、服務及零售部門。這些企業的賬麵價值合計達1910億美元，大部分是在過去十年間積累起來的。用這一衡量標準，伯克希爾是美國第二大工業集團。但其工業分支的經營業績實在平平無奇，如果再計入商譽，其股本回報率僅為6％，低2007年伯克希爾改變經營策略前的9％（這些數字不包括無形資產的攤銷，與巴菲特評估利潤的標準一致）。

The industrial businesses" lacklustre recordmean they account for about 60% of Berkshire"s sunk capital but have generated only about half of its look through profits, and 40% of its growth inbook valueover the past five years. For the five big industrial companies where figures are consistently available, total profits have risen by 4% a year since 2012, which is no better thana basket ofsimilar peers. Profits at BNSF, for example, have risen only just above inflation andin line withother railways. Speaking to CNBC on Februarv 26th. Mr Buffett suggested that a sixth business, PC, had not met its own internal targets.

這些工業企業的表現乏善可陳，雖然它們佔了伯克希爾沉沒資本的約60％但過去五年只貢獻了透視利潤的約50％和賬麵價值增長的40％。一直有公開數據可查的五家大型工業企業中，自2012年來利潤總額年增速為4％，並沒有高過同業的平均水平。舉例來說，BNSF的利潤增速僅略高於通脹率，與其他鐵路公司相當。上月26日巴菲特在接受CNBC專訪時表示，伯克希爾收購的第六大工業企業精密機件公司的表現未達到集團內部目標。

Since Berkshirecranks out an annual return ofabout 8-11% a year overall, the other area of its business, its financial operations, must have done much better. These include insurance underwriting, leasing, stock-picking, gains on derivatives and lucrative one- off transactions struck by Mr Buffett, for example when he bought bonds issued by Goldman Sachs and General Electric during the financial crisis. Overall, Berkshire"s financial arm has a solid average ROE of 11%, achieved with low leverage.

既然伯克希爾每年的總體回報率約為8％至11％，那麼它涉足的另一個領域也就是金融業務的業績一定好得多。這包括保險、租賃、選股服務、衍生品收益及巴菲特達成的獲利豐厚的一次性交易，例如他在金融危機期間購買的由高盛和通用電氣發行的債券。總的來說，伯克希爾旗下金融業務的股本回報率平均為穩健的11％，而且是以低槓桿取得。

Why, then, is Berkshire making large industrial acquisitions? There is a chance that profits will grow faster in future, pushing up the low ROE of the acquired businesses, yet most of them are mature. Or Berkshire may hope that selected acquisitions, when valued in line with their listed peers, will show a big rise in their value since being bought, which accounting profits do not capture. BNSF, which Berkshire bought in the depths of the crisis in 2009, has yielded an annual return of about 15% if measured in this way. However the other deals are unlikely to look nearly as good: two thirds of them (by value) took place after the end of 2011, once markets had bounced back from the crash.

那麼，伯克希爾為何還在大規模收購工業企業？一種可能是它指望未來利潤增長會加速，推高被收購企業目前低迷的股本回報率。但它們大多已無太大的增長空間。或者，伯克希爾可能希望，收購時估值與上市同業一致的部分企業在收購後價值會大幅上漲，而這是會計利潤未能反映出來的。如果以此計算，伯克希爾在2009年金融危機深重之時收購的BNSF年收益率約達15％。然而，其他被收購企業的表現遠不及此：三分之（按價值計算）的收購是在2011年底後發生，當時市場已從金融危機的谷底反彈。

Crossroads in Omaha

奧馬哈的十字路口

Berkshire has three possible paths forward. One is that Mr Buffett and his partner, Charles Munger, return cash to shareholders and accept that Berkshire must be less ambitious. The two men do not seem ready for this. A second is that they do more big takeovers now, with stockmarkets high. That would likely depress Berkshire"s returns for years and make it more reliant on fireworks from its financial arm.The third path is that Mr Buffett and Mr Munger sit and wait, hoping for a stockmarket crash,when Berkshire"swar chestwill let it pick up bargains that make better returns than its recent acquisitions have done. Twenty years ago this strategy would have been uncontroversial, but the two men are aged, respectively, 87 and 94. Berkshire is enough of a conundrum to perplex even the world"s greatest value investor.

伯克希爾前路有三一是巴菲特及其合伙人查理·芒格（CharlesMunger）向股東返還資金，並承認伯克希爾必須收斂野心。但兩人似乎還沒有這樣的打算。第二條路是在股市處於高位的當下開展更多大型收購。這可能會壓制伯克希爾未來多年的回報，使之更依賴旗下金融業務的出彩表現。第三條路是巴菲特和芒格持幣觀望，坐待股市崩盤，到時伯克希爾將可使用這些儲備資金低價收購企業，得到高於近期收購的回報。如果是在20年前，這一策略不會有什麼爭議，但問題是現在兩人分別已是87歲和94歲高齡。伯克希爾已然是一道謎題，足以讓全球最偉大的價值投資者也為之撓頭。

辭彙積累：

The returns look pedestrian 看起來回報平平

Its recent deals have had drab results, suggesting a pivot to mediocrity.

它近期的併購回報平平，似有漸入平庸之勢。

The share of its capital sunk into industry 投入工業領域的資本

Yet it is not an obvious formula for superior performance

然而，這並不是造就卓越業績的一條公認的公式

Can Berkshire turn water into wine?

伯克希爾能點石成金嗎？

industrial concern

You can refer to a company or business as a concern, usually when you are describing what type of company or business it is. 公司; 生意

例：If not a large concern, the Potomac Nursery was at least a successful one.

雖不是一個大生意，波托馬克幼兒園至少是一個成功的公司。

bog standard (不按質量分等級的)一般產品，一般水平；普通的，一般的，不突出的，非挑選出來的

theamortisationof intangible assets 無形資產的攤銷

The industrial businesses" lacklustre record 這些工業企業的表現乏善可陳

book value 賬麵價值

crank out an annual return of 每年的總體回報率

must be less ambitious 必須收斂野心

depress Berkshire"s returns for years 壓制伯克希爾未來多年的回報

war chest (為如競選籌措的)專用資金

Those results are worthy of Mr Buffett 這些結果不負巴菲特的英名

a certain amount of guesswork 一點猜測

1. The third path is that Mr Buffett and Mr Munger sit and wait, hoping for a stockmarket crash, when Berkshire"s war chest will let it pick up bargains that make better returns than its recent acquisitions have done.

第三條路是巴菲特和芒格持幣觀望，坐待股市崩盤，到時伯克希爾將可使用這些儲備資金低價收購企業，得到高於近期收購的回報。

2. Berkshire is enough of a conundrum to perplex even the world"s greatest value investor.

伯克希爾已然是一道謎題，足以讓全球最偉大的價值投資者也為之撓頭。

3. Berkshire thinks of itself as a friendly buyer to which families and entrepreneurs are happy to pass on their crown jewels.

伯克希爾自視為友善的買家，家族和企業家都樂意把自己珍視的企業出售託付。

4. There is something comforting about its mission to be a home for old-school businesses run by all-American heroes.

它的宗旨是成為匯聚全美精英人物經營的老牌企業的家園，聽起來讓人感到些許寬慰。

5. Yet it is not an obvious formula for superior performance. 然而，這並不是造就卓越業績的一條公認的公式。

6. But Mr Buffett"s behemoth is a puzzle. Its recent deals have had drab results, suggesting a pivot to mediocrity.

但巴菲特的這家巨獸公司令人費解。它近期的併購回報平平，似有漸入平庸之勢。

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