福山播客（一）：歷史的終結與最後的人

這是選·美的第1026篇文章

本文轉載自WelfareDestination（ID：willdot）。本文轉載已獲福山教授授權。

翻譯了福山四篇播客內容，前三篇是關於歷史終結論的論述，之前用了三篇文章做了介紹，這是完整的中英文翻譯版本，第四篇是福山關於公共政策專業教育重塑的思考。

很多人認為福山對未來的預測錯的離譜，但是在聽過福山的觀點之後會發現他本人並不是這樣看待的。在不到一個月之前，福山又做客Ezra Klein Show,，談了他的新書，對很多東西的看法還是很具有啟發性的。而下文中的播客內容，前三篇的內容串聯了福山至少五本書的內容，分別是母本《歷史的終結及最後之人》，關於科技對歷史終結影響的著作《我們的後人類未來：生物科技革命的後果》，關於人類歷史的演進對歷史終結影響的著作《政治秩序的起源：從前人類時代到法國大革命》《政治秩序與政治衰敗·從工業革命到民主全球化》，關於身份政治對歷史終結影響的著作《Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment》，在談到自己的結論時，還提到了亨廷頓的理論對歷史終結論的影響，涉及到的三本著作是《變化社會中的政治秩序》《第三波：20世紀後期的民主化浪潮》《文明的衝突與世界秩序的重建》。一起來聽一聽福山對自己觀點的闡釋吧。

翻譯並非逐句按照字面意思翻譯，存在不通順和理解錯誤之處還請指出。翻譯以及分享已獲得教授許可。

選·美獲授權

對於福山的觀點，我記得在第一次閱讀社會科學出版社收錄於《國際學術前沿觀察》叢書的時候有這樣一段前言：

「作為中國讀者，我們希望在閱讀該書過程中一定要注意採取批判態度。作為一名西方資產階級學者，福山的反共立場是十分鮮明的，書中不乏較為露骨的詞句（為尊重作者著作權，本書未作刪改）。對於其立場及觀點，我們是不能接受的。對於其研究方法，我們認為明顯偏頗。比如，書中他自始至終未分清共產主義和社會主義的基本概念以致將傳統社會主義（指實行中央計劃經濟體制）與作為人類一種遠大理想、實現之日將十分遙遠漫長的共產主義混為一談，甚至還將社會主義、極權主義、法西斯主義相提並論。這些可以清楚地反映出其學術視野的片面與局限，希望讀者一定要加以鑒別和批判。」

嗯，一定要批判一下，所以為了批判的方便，文中內容在我聽力能力之內未有修改。而對於政治理論和政治實踐之間的關係，引用一段我在Facebook收到的反饋，來自莊小渃：

「這些學者的研究都有一定的價值，給人們實踐和依循的參考，但也就僅止於此了，社會改變不是說出來的，只能夠一代代人的實踐。當我們小民落在社會、國家這麼龐大的集體洪流時，首先，要比氣長才能看到改變（這是曾經熱血青年的我私人給的一點建議，當然你可以完全不接受）要活的有力量又不委屈自己（的原則）是很大的考驗！比方，學者作研究的桌子、電腦、屋子、燈光、門簾和偶爾休憩的沙發都有賴社會百工的分工合作；接地氣是很重要的，特別是經濟獨立才能思想獨立（套一句我的老師李敖說的話）。歐美民主選舉政體，今日觀來其實是有些瑕疵的；英日丹麥等國的君主立憲，也有或多或少的問題。我沒有足夠的能力和知識評估中國的未來。但未來不就在每一位諸位身上嗎？只要動手實踐，在自己能力所及的範圍，持續下去，日起有功，一定會改變甚麼的！」

這是一篇匯總文章，大部分內容於之前的三篇筆記中均有提及。至於福山對於政治實踐的思考，收錄於他關於重塑公共政策教育思考的播客中。由於篇幅的限制，第四篇內容將在下一篇文章中進行呈現。

End of History Revisited Part 1

This is Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law podcast. We are studying why governments fail. We are going to talk about economic and political development at home and around the world.

Today we are listening to Francis Fukuyama, the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli institute of Stanford University. Welcome to the CDDRL democracy world.

This is a podcast on the End Of History in retrospect. The single question I』ve been asked most incessantly since 1989 is, 「Well, what about the end of history? Doesn』t X invalidate the thesis that you articulated back then?」 where X is something that has happened in the newspapers and on television, some big events in international politics. This question is usually asked by somebody that did not understand the original concept of the end of history, and who has not read my book The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992. So the purpose of this podcast is simply to go over that hypothesis and to explain what I meant by it, and to explain the ways which my thinking since then have actually changed. It would actually be strange if the passage of almost thirty years time did not lead to a certain evolution in the way that I thought about the world. But nonetheless it is important to distinguish between reasonable critiques and ones that are silly or based on simple misunderstandings.

Let』s begin with the discussion of the title of my original article 「The End Of History? 「 that appeared in the journal The National Interest in the summer of 1989. 「History」 as I was using it was the history with a capital 「H」. There are other words that people use to describe the same phenomenon today as more likely to be spoken of as development or perhaps modernization. The End of History was meant more as the goal rather than simply a termination so that the End of History was raising the question: what is the terminal point or what is the goal of the development process or the modernization process.

讓我們從討論最初於1989年夏天發表在《國家利益》期刊上的那篇論文「歷史終結了嗎？」開始吧。在這裡，我把英文History的首字母大寫了，所以這裡的這個History, 用今天的時髦的辭彙表達出來就是「發展」或者「現代化」的意思。所以The End of History這個理論所要探索的是一種目標，而不僅僅是一個終點，也就是說The End of History是提出了這樣的一個問題：人類發展或者現代化的目標是什麼；哪些現象的出現會證明現代化的終點達到了？

The phase the End of History was not the one originated to me. It was used first by the great German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel was the first historicism philosopher meaning that you could not interpret thought or human institutions without understanding their historical evolution. His mode of thinking was taken over by Karl Marx who in a certain sense had the most famous version of the end of history. Marx argued that human societies evolved. They modernize from primitive feudal ones up through bourgeois societies. And the end of history for Marx was a communist utopia. This was his prediction and his hope. The simple argument I made was that in 1989 it didn』t look like Marx』s version of the end of history was going to work out. We were never going to get that communist utopia. Mikhail Gorbachev was putting Soviet Union through [perestroika and glasnost] accepting the basic principles of modern liberal democracy and therefore if there was to be an end of history, it wasn』t going to be communism. It was going to be some form of liberal democracy connected to market economy.

The End of History這個概念並不是我的原創，它最先是被偉大的德國哲學家黑格爾所使用的。黑格爾是第一位歷史主義哲學家，這個學派所倡導的是必須研究與解釋人類歷史發展，基於這些解釋才能認真了解社會與政治。之後，卡馬很好的繼承了這一學派思想的衣缽，而卡馬在某種意義上，提出了我們所知道的最有名的歷史終結理論。卡馬認為人類社會是不斷發展的，它們現代化的路徑是從原始的封建社會一路發展到資本主義社會，最終卡馬認為人類的歷史將會終結於共產主義：這是卡馬所預言並且寄予希望的。但是在1989年，我提出的論點是卡馬的歷史的終結的理論不太可能行得通，人類社會的發展永遠都到不了共產主義：當時的現實是，戈正在蘇聯進行改革開放，並且接受了現代自由民主思想的一些基本原則。所以說如果歷史的發展有一個最終目標的話，從那個時候來看，它不會是共產主義，它應該是自由民主和市場經濟相結合的一種模式。

The idea of the end of history was taken up again in the 1930s and 1940s by Alexandre Kojève. Kojève was a Russian French philosopher who led perhaps one of the most influential seminars in the mid-twentieth century, a seminar in Paris that included many of the great intellectual lights of the post-war period: Raymond Queneau, Georges Bataille, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, Raymond Aron and éric Weil. Kojève argued that Hegel was fundamentally right that history had ended. He asserted moreover that history ended in the year 1806 at the time of the Battle of Jena when the Prussian monarchy was defeated by Napoleon.

黑格爾和卡馬之後，The End of History的觀念在1930和40年代的時候又被人們重新拿出來討論，引導這場討論的就是俄裔法國哲學家亞歷山大·科耶夫。當時科耶夫在巴黎組織了一系列圍繞黑格爾的研討會，常來聽講的都是當時法國最重要的知識分子，包括雷蒙·格諾，喬治·巴代伊，莫里斯·梅洛-龐蒂，雅各·拉岡，雷蒙·阿隆等人。科耶夫提出的觀點認為黑格爾的思路大體上是正確的，並且科耶夫認為歷史已經發展到終點了，我們現在所處的就是後歷史時代。他更進一步的認為歷史的終結髮生在1806年耶拿戰爭之後，當時拿破崙率領的軍隊打敗了普魯士的君主制。

《亞歷山大·科耶夫：哲學，國家與歷史的終結》

Now note, this was an assertion that was made right on the eve of the Second World War, in a tumultuous early 20th century that had seen the First World War: the killing of millions of people, the Bolshevik Revolution and was shortly to see the Chinese Revolution and the liberation of much of the what came to be known as the Third World from the colonial domination.

但是注意啦，這個斷言所提出的時代，恰恰是第二次世界大戰的前夜，在此之前，伏屍百萬的第一次世界大戰剛剛結束，布爾什維克在俄國取得了革命的勝利，一種新的意識形態出現了，而不久之後，人類又將目睹發生在我國的紅色革命以及第三世界國家擺脫殖民統治的獨立浪潮。

On the surface this is an absurd statement. But when a brilliant thinker like Alexandre Kojève makes something that sounds like an absurd statement, you need to think a little bit below the surface as to what he really meant. He was being ironic but in a certain sense he was pointing to an important truth, namely that the world had not progressed substantially beyond the principles of the French Revolution, that is to say beyond a political system based on the twin principles of liberty and equality, the principles of modern politics. And for all the storm that occurred in the 20th century or in the years since 1806, fundamentally what we were seeing was simply the spread of these principles from the metropolitan area to the provinces of the world.

從表面上看，這個觀點是站不住腳的。但是如果這個連你都覺得可笑的觀點被一位公認很有影響的思想家提出來的時候，你就要想一想是不是你的想法才是可笑的了。科耶夫的觀點是有點搞，但是他也指出來了一個事實，就是世界發展的大潮流，並沒有超出法國大革命所提出來的自由和平等這兩個原則。也就是說1806年以後我們所看到的只不過是舊理念的傳播，並沒有新理念的產生。

What I was arguing in my 1989 article was not all that original. Maybe Kojève and behind him the Hegel were actually right. Maybe the fundamental principles of a modern society had been established 200 years ago and what we were witnessing was simply the implementation of them in different countries around the world. Maybe with reforms going on in the former Soviet Union and at that time in China as well, we would never arrived at socialism, we would never get to that higher stage of human society and that what we saw imperfect as it was was all we were going to get. That was the basic idea.

而我在1989年的論文中提出來的觀點也並不全是原創的：也許科耶夫和黑格爾的理論是對的：人類社會發展的基本原則早在200多年前就已經確立了，我們所目睹的僅僅是它們的傳播；或者也有可能如果隨著前蘇聯以及那個年代我國改革的進行，人類社會永遠都不會進入更高階的社會主義，而我們所看到的不完美就是我們所能獲得的一切。這是基本的觀點。（沒看懂這裡說了個什麼）

So one group of the critics would never fundamentally misunderstood my argument were actually the Marxism. There were meetings in Cuba, in the Soviet Union and other communist countries where people understood my argument about the end of history and they understood that it was a fundamental challenge to their own beliefs about the directionality of history.

所以從這一點上來說，卡馬主義學者是永遠不會從根本上誤解我的論點的。這些學者在共產主義國家舉行會議，他們不僅明白我關於歷史終結的理論闡釋了什麼，並且他們將此看成是對他們的根本信念的挑戰。

At the time that I wrote the article in the winter of 1988 and 1989, I was working as a policy analyst at the think tank the Rand Corporation, studying Soviet domestic politics. Mikhail Gorbachev recently had given a speech which he said, 「the essence of socialism was competition.」 When I heard this, I called up one of my friends who understood Hegel and said, 「If Gorbachev is saying this then we must be at the end of History.」

我在1988年和1989年之間寫作這篇文章之時，還是蘭德公司專攻蘇聯內政的一位政策分析師。戈最近做了一次演講，其中他說到社會主義的本質是競爭。我聽到這句話之後一驚，馬上就給我一位研究黑格爾的朋友打電話，他的反應是，如果戈真的這樣說了，那麼我們就已經到達歷史的終點了。

The actual provenance of the article was a lecture series that was organized by Allan Bloom, my former teacher at the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago that winter. The overall rubric of the lecture series was the decline of the West. I was asked to give a lecture in it and I said, 「Well, I had a lecture that would fit except the theme would not be the decline of the West but rather the triumph of the West.」 I gave the lecture and then a couple months later was visited by Owen Harries who was the editor of a new magazine: The National Interest. He was soliciting ideas for articles and I told him about this lecture and he agreed to publish it and the rest so to speak is history.

這篇文章的實際出處是由Allan Bloom所組織的系列講座，Allan Bloom是我的老師，當年他是芝大社會思想委員會的一名老師。這個系列講座的主題是西方的衰落，我也被邀請做一次講座。我當時就說了，講座沒問題，但是主題是關於西方的勝利。我給出了這次講座，然後又過了幾個月，Owen Harries正給新成立的國家利益期刊尋找文章，我就把這個系列講座推薦給了他，他也同意發表我的文章。

The argument that I made in that 1989 article was not that democracy had suddenly come to characterize the whole world or that it would necessarily spread everywhere, much less that events somehow would stop occurring. The argument was rather that there did not seem to be superior alternatives port which the world appeared to be evolving.

我在1989年的文章中提出的論點並不是說民主突然就成為了全世界的標配了，或者它一定會在全世界範圍內傳播。何況這種傳播將會在不久的將來停止。我在文中提出的觀點是，按照當時的世界發展趨勢來看，似乎並沒有比自由民主和市場經濟結合更高級的替代的形式出現。

The theory of History that I put forward in my book The End of History and the Last Man is what I back then describe as a weak version of modernization theory. A strong version of this theory was the dominant paradigm in American Social Science back in the 1950s and 60s. This strong version held that economic, social, political and cultural aspects of modernization were part of a single evolutionary process and they are that they were all mutually supportive as societies became richer, became more open, they became more democratic, this view became untenable in no small measure because of a critique made by Samuel Huntington in his book Political Order in Changing Societies that appeared in 1967. Huntington said that the political and economic dimensions of modernization often acted at cross purposes from one another. If there was too rapid social mobilization that outstrip the rate of political development, the result was not a happy democratic society but rather instability. In later years, Huntington would focus on another issue, culture. And the argument is societies would not converge over time but would remain trapped within preexisting cultural horizons.

而我在1992年的書里的觀點可以說是一種弱化了的現代化理論。而強化版的理論是20世界50，60年代美國社會科學界所提出的主導範式理論。這一理論認為現代化的四個方面：經濟，社會，政治和文化的現代化是一個單一進程的一部分，隨著社會變得越來越富有，開放和民主，它們是會相互促進和支持的。但是根據亨廷頓在其1967年的書中所提出的觀點，這種模式發展下去是會變得難以為繼的。亨廷頓認為政治的現代化和經濟的現代化是會彼此之間存在衝突的：如果社會流動的速度超過了政治發展的速度，結果就不是一個幸福民主的社會。之後亨廷頓又將他的研究轉向了文化這個角度，提出的觀點是社會並不會隨著時間的推移出現趨同化，而是會被困在之前的文化背景中。

The driver of modernization described in my 1992 book was the weak version of this theory, it was weak because it allowed for contingency and human agency. Nothing was inevitable or pre-determined. Nonetheless I argued that modernization was a coherent process that did not look terribly different cross different human cultures. The reason for this was the nature of technology or what I call the 「mechanism」. At any given stage of human history, the prevailing forms of technology determined a frontier of production possibilities. The prevailing form of economic organization then had critical effects on social organization and ultimately shaped the nature of politics as well. Thus, for example, the technologies of cold steel in large-scale manufacturing abandon the prior agrarian order and require both urbanization and higher levels of education. By contrast, the early phases of information revolution ended the monopoly on information of various hierarchies like the state and made horizontal mobilization more available, in other words it was more suitable to democratization. Higher levels of income would then produce a middle class that among all things being equal would have preferences for greater participation in political affairs. This explained the relatively strong correlation between countries that were wealthy and countries were democratic around the world.

而我書裡面描述的現代化的驅動力就是這個理論的弱化版本。之所以說是弱化的版本是因為其中加入了一些無可避免的偶然因素。儘管如此，我當時還是認為現代化是一個一以貫之的過程：在人類的不同文化之間並沒有什麼不同。我保持這樣的觀點，是因為在我看來，在人類社會的任何階段，技術的形式決定了生產方式，在此基礎上的經濟組織方式又對社會組織以及政治產生影響。

舉一個例子，鋼鐵大規模生產中的冷軋技術使得人類擺脫了先前的農業秩序，促進了城市化和高等教育的發展。相比之下，信息革命的早期階段就結束了之前各個層面對信息的壟斷，這就使得社會的橫向流動更順暢了。換句話說，信息的開放使得民主化的條件成熟了。更高的收入水平催生了中產階級，而這個階級對於政治參與的熱情明顯提高，這也解釋了國家的富裕程度和民主化之間為什麼有很強的關聯性。

The clearest example of economic development leading to social convergence has been arisen in east Asian. Industrialization has taken root across the region from Japan to Korean to Taiwan to CN. In each case, the social transformations brought about by this process have led to a convergence with western countries that went through it in earlier generations. There has been a massive shift of populations from the countryside to cities, greater investment in education and skills, development of urban middle class and a more complex and interdependent division of labor.

經濟發展促進社會趨同的最典型的例子發生在東亞。工業化已經在日本，韓國，台灣，大陸等地區紮根。在這些例子當中，社會轉型又導致了與西方國家的趨同，而西方國家在早前也經歷了類似的過程。而這中間，又發生了人口的大規模遷移，對教育和技術的投資增加，城市中產階級的發展，更複雜和相互依存的勞動分工的出現等一系列的現象。

In the cases of Japan, South Korean and Taiwan, there is also a political convergence. Each of these countries became liberal democracies over time, the latter two making the transition during the 1980s, right at the point when they shifted from being predominantly agrarian to predominantly urban industrial societies.

而在前三個地區，還發生了政治上同西方國家的趨同，隨著時間的推移，它們都轉變為自由民主的政體。而韓國和台灣地區在1980年代的轉型恰好處在它們的經濟模式從農業轉向城鎮化和工業化的時候。

This has not been a universal pattern, however. Singapore has a higher per capita income than the United States and yet remains a liberal electoral authoritarian regime. CN has now reached a level of income comparable to that of South Korean and Taiwan in the 1980s and under X has moved in the opposite direction to a more repressive form of dictatorship.

但是注意了，上面提到的這個例子並不是普適的，比如新加坡就是一個特例。新加坡的人均GDP高於美國，但是政治上仍然是一個自由選舉的專制政權。而中國大陸現在的收入水平已經達到了韓國和台灣1980年代的水平了，但是在X的領導之下，政治的發展方向卻朝著獨裁的方向去了。

There were number of qualifications to this picture that I painted back in 1992. Apart from the Chinese exception to which I will return shortly, there are several missing pieces to this picture that I understand much better now than I did in the early 1990s.

這就引起了我的反思。如果把我1992年所勾勒的人類社會發展的藍圖比喻成一幅畫的話，很明顯這幅畫作還沒有完成，還有缺失的部分，而我現在對於這些缺失部分的了解要比我在1990年代的理解深入的多。不過對於這些缺失，中國的因素我將單獨分析。

The first was the question of how economic growth starts in the first place. Once you get on the up escalator, there are predictable social and political consequences. But many parts of the world seem mired in poverty with no realistic hopes of replicating the growth path charted by Japan, Korean and China. The reasons why such growth has not become more universal has to do with the lack of institutions and particularly a lack of a modern state. My earlier theory had focused on democracy and did not pay enough attention to the prerequisite of a relatively impersonal state that would maintain social order and provide basic public goods. Getting to such a modern state, what I subsequently labeled as 「getting to Denmark」 is actually a significantly more difficult task of political construction than is getting to some form of electoral democracy. Today there are well over 100 countries that would qualify as the latter: that is the electoral democracies including places like Iraq and Afghanistan. But there are only perhaps a couple dozen countries can boast of having a truly modern state. The reason that countries in East Asia have developed economically so successfully in the past two generations lie in the fact that they have developed the modern states prior to their confrontation with the West. They did not have to create such institutions as part of their modernization projects. But for other parts of the world, like sub-Saharan Africa where modern states often did not exist prior to colonization, the path to economic growth has been far more difficult, because they didn』t have the institutional frameworks for growth to occur. This then raised a question that I completely ignored in the 1992 book, which is the origins of the modern state itself. I have tried to correct this in my two-volume Political Order series which traces the rise, first, of states out of tribal societies and then the transition from patrimonial to modern states. The mechanism here to the extent is one has been military competition. States are more powerful than tribal societies and modern states are more powerful than patrimonial ones, so the relentless quest for security drives societies to adopt meritocracy and impersonal government as organizing principles.

我首先想到的問題就是，經濟增長到底是如何開始的。打個比方，如果把經濟的增長當做一部上升的扶梯，人們很容易去預測它未來的發展。但是世界上很多地方的發展是陷入貧困之中的，這些地區並沒有複製類似日本韓國這樣經濟騰飛的模式。原因就在於制度保障上的缺乏，特別是現代國家形成條件的缺乏。然而我早期的理論過多的關注在民主的發展上，對於維持社會秩序和提供基本的公共產品的這些客觀的先決條件的關注是不足的。要建設這樣的一個現代化國家（我把這個過程稱為」抵達丹麥「），我現在意識到這是一個更加複雜和艱巨的過程，並不僅僅是實現某種形式的選舉民主就可以達到的，我之前大意了。按照我之前的理論，當今世界有資格實行選舉民主的國家有100多個，這裡面甚至包括阿富汗和伊朗。但是真正意義上的現代國家就鳳毛麟角了。而我之前所提到的東亞地區在經濟上之所以成功，是因為他們在和西方文明發生衝撞之前已經發展成了現代國家的形式。他們不必要為了達到現代化來創建那些為之提供保障的機構。但是對於世界上其他地區而言，諸如撒哈拉沙漠以南的國家，現代國家的概念在他們被殖民之前根本就是不存在的，這樣看下去，經濟的發展沒有了這些客觀條件的保障就要困難的多了。而這引出了我在1992年的書中完全忽視掉的一個問題，就是關於現代國家的起源。我在之後出版了兩卷本的《政治秩序的起源》的書籍，希望能夠糾正我之前的觀點。這兩卷本的書籍從描述部落社會中的國家興起開始，然後呈現了從世襲制到現代國家的過渡過程。而這個過程在一定程度上其實是一場軍事的競爭：正式因為世襲國家比部落更加強大，現代國家又比世襲國家更加強大，因此出於對安全的追求激發了社會向著任人唯賢的組織原則轉變。

This hypothesis that state makes war and war makes the state has been associated with sociologist Charles Tilly. It』s neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to explain why states exist in any given country. For that we need to consider other factors like climate, geography, religious beliefs and the like. All of which makes for a more complex and a much more messy overall theory.

這種國家構建和戰爭相互作用的假設是和社會學家Charles Tilly緊密相關的，但是對於解釋為什麼在任何國家中均存在政府這就既不是充分也不是必要條件了。對於此，我們還需要考慮諸如氣候條件，地理成因，宗教信仰等其他的因素，而這使得整體的理論更加的複雜了。

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