福山播客（三）：身份政治與「歷史的終結」

這是選·美的第1029篇文章

這講播客的內容聚焦在歷史的終結理論和身份認同的關係上。關於這一點，我注意到已經有一些評論出現在了社交網站上，我覺得有必要從一開始討論一下兩者的關係。正如有人在社交網路上揶揄道：難以置信，一個在25年前宣稱歷史終結的人，現在居然著手去出版一本論述身份認同作為政治驅動因素的書籍。

而這件事情的事實卻是，從我1992年的書籍開始，我就一直在寫作關於身份認同的文章。1992年書籍的標題是《歷史的終結及最後之人》，那些膚淺的評論並沒有深入到書籍的內容之中，甚至忽略了關於最後之人論述的章節。

而後者引用自尼採的「沒有胸膛的人」的概念，這一概念所指的是在歷史的終結之時出現的一種溫順無情感的人。他們沒有胸膛的原因在於他們沒有榮譽感，而且那種無助感也會引發對現代世界的反抗。我在1992年的書中所論述的現代民主社會的根本缺陷在於它未能解決Thumos這個問題，Thumos這個詞語翻譯成英語意為「精神」，蘇格拉底在理想國一書中對其有過討論。更具體的解釋就是人類精神世界中對個人尊嚴得到承認的需求，也是諸如驕傲，憤怒，羞恥這些情緒產生的地方。黑格爾則認為其是整個人類歷史發展的主要推動力量。

我在1992年的書中用了兩個詞來劃分thumos，我將其標記為「isothymia」和「megalothymia」。前者所指是被認為和其他人平等的願望，這一點存在於大多數現代身份政治之中，身份政治出現在1960年代，伴隨著那時候的社會運動而出現，圍繞著不同的邊緣化群體諸如少數族裔，婦女，男女同性戀者，殘疾人等。他們的中心訴求是對其身份的平等認同並且對他們當時所處社會地位的一種補償；而相比之下，後者是指被認為高人一等與眾不同的願望。自由民主政體的設計原則之一就是為了遏制這種思潮，例如美國的開國元勛就設計了一套複雜的制衡制度以防止類似凱撒式的集權的出現，正如詹姆斯麥迪遜所說，野心需要通過野心來實現制衡。而我實際上在1992年的書中舉了川普的例子，把他當做是一個野心勃勃的人，在當時看來，他的精力集中在了商業上，但是對於當時的我萬萬沒想到的是，集中在商業領域對於他的野心來說是完全不夠的。

我在1992年的書中指出，民族主義抑或是宗教這種強大的力量在現代世界中並不會憑空消失。正如我在新書中所解釋的那樣，這兩者都可以被看做是身份認同的需求。現代自由民主體制的穩定性被這樣一個事實所威脅：它並沒解決身份認同所帶來的問題。現代自由民主政體對公民承諾了對其身份的認同，但是在實踐層面卻打了折扣。此外，眾口難調，並不是所有人都對普遍意義上的身份認同感到滿意，有些人希望對自己所屬的小眾的身份和組織的認同，這種渴求對於遭受了邊緣化對待的人來說尤其強烈。這也是美國今天推動諸如黑命貴（編者註：Black Live Matter，直譯為「黑人的命也是命」）運動和米兔運動的動力所在。而這種對於特殊身份認同的需求還可以通過民族主義或者伊斯蘭主義者捍衛自己的社區的方式來達到，或者像川普這樣通過煽動的方式達成。

很明顯，對於我在1989或者1992年所提出的理論，我已經做出了許多修改。歷史的終結寫作於亨廷頓所謂的第三波浪潮風起雲湧之時，但是在過去的十年中，我們也清楚了目睹了民主衰退的過程。我依然對歷史的發展有方向性的觀點以及現代化的進程指向的是自由民主最充分的體現的觀點充滿信心。但是和1992年相比，到達目的地所需要的實踐變得更難了，而且政治體制衰退的可能始終存在。我兩卷本的政治秩序的起源系列圖書可以被看成是我基於目前對於全球政治的理解而做出的對於歷史終結論的最新理解。我將會在另一個播客中做出更全面的介紹。

福山在9月27日做客Ezra Klein Show，詳談對新書的看法，並且推薦了兩本關於民主政治中不理性成分的書籍，播客時長一個半小時，具體翻譯內容將在下篇微信推送中釋出。

This is Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law podcast. We are studying why governments fail. We are going to talk about economic and political development at home and around the world. Welcome to CDDRL democracy world.

This is Francis Fukuyama, Mosbacher Director of Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

This podcast concerns the relationship of identity and the end of history. Since this point has already come up in some social media commentary on my new book Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, I should address from the outset the relationship of this work to what I had written on The End of History. As someone said on social media: Hard to believe that someone who proclaim the end of history 25 years ago now gets to publish on identity as the driving factor on politics. The fact of the matter is that I have been writing about identity consistently over the years beginning with my 1992 book. The title of that work was The End of History and the Last Man. My superficial critics did not bother to read the book and in particular ignored the concluding chapters on the last man.

The latter of course was a reference to Nietzsche』s men without chests that is the docile passionless individuals who emerged at the end of History. They had no chests because they has no pride and that very passionlessness was what would drive a revolt against the modern world. The fundamental defect of our modern prosperous democratic world I said back in 1992 was its failure to address the problem of 「thumos」. Thumos is a Greek word usually translated into English as 「spiritedness」 which Socrates discusses in the book The Republic, which is a part of the human personality that demands recognition of one』s inner dignity and the seat of the emotions of pride, anger and shame. Thumos are argued following G.W.F. Hegel, has been the primary driver of the entire human historical process.

In my 1992 book, I distinguish between two manifestations of thumos which I labeled 「isothymia」 and 「megalothymia」. The former is the desire to be recognized as the equal of the other people and it is the emotion underlying much of the modern identity politics. Identity politics began to take off in the 1960s following the major social movement that emerged then, built around the marginalization of different groups and society: racial minorities, women, gays and lesbians, the disabled and so on. The central demand was equal recognition of their dignity together with a substantive redress of their social condition. Megalothymia, by contrast, was the demand of certain individuals to be recognized as superior to others. Liberal democracies were designed in part to contain megalothymia: the American founding fathers devised a complex constitutional system of checks and balances to prevent a would-be Caesar from centralizing power, as the historical Caesar had done at the end of the Roman Republic. As James Madison said, ambition was needed to counter ambition. I actually mentioned Donald Trump back in my 1992 book, presenting him as an example of a hugely ambitious individual whose energies had been, it seemed at the time, safely diverted into entrepreneurship. Little did I know back then that this wouldn』t be enough for him.

I stated in The End of History and the Last Man that neither nationalism nor religion were about to disappear as powerful forces in the modern world. As I explain in my new book, both can be seen as thematic demands for recognition. The stability of modern liberal democracy is threatened by the fact that it does not fully solve the problem of thumos either of its manifestation. Modern liberal democracy promised universal recognition of the dignity of its citizens, but frequently failed to deliver on these promises. Moreover, not everyone is satisfied with universal recognition: people want recognition of their particular identities and the groups to which they feel bound, particularly if they have suffered a history of marginalization. That』s what』s driving the Black Lives Matter and the #MeToo movements today. Demands for particularistic recognition can also take the form of nationalists or Islamists defending the dignity of their communities, or of ambitious demagogues like Donald Trump.

For the record, I have obviously modified many of the views I expressed back in 1989 or 1992. The End of History was written at the mid-point of what Samuel Huntington labeled the Third Wave of democratization, and for the past decade we have clearly been in what my colleague Larry Diamond labels a 「democratic recession.」 I still believe that history is directional and progressive, and that the modernization process points to liberal democracy as its fullest embodiment. But getting there is harder than I believed in 1992, and the possibility of institutional decay is ever-present. My two volumes The Origins of Political Order and Political Order and Political Decay should be seen an effort to rewrite The End of History and the Last Man based on what I now understand about global politics. I will provide a fuller account of this rethinking in a different podcast. Thank you.

Thank you for listening. This podcast is produced by Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Feel free to use it in classrooms and for other educational purposes. Follow us on Twitter, Facebook and Medium.

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